Sovereign Multi-Sig Constitution
The constitution.
Cryptographically enforced.
Platform-wide invariants encoded as Base Constitutional Rules. Enforced at L828 below all business logic. Modification requires two-thirds majority threshold attestation from independent verification nodes.
Base Constitutional Rules
BCR-001 through BCR-005
BCR-001
● ACTIVEPlatform earnings allocation
Specifies the proportion of every transaction credited to developers before the response is returned. Encoded at Layer L828, below all business logic, routing logic, and provider selection logic. Violation of this rule produces an INVARIANT_BREACH event that halts the transaction immediately.
Enforcement layer: L828 — Executes before response is returned on every billable call
BCR-002
● ACTIVEWORM audit obligation
Every billable event must be sealed in the WORM ledger using SHA-256 before the response is returned to the caller. No response may be returned from a billable call without a corresponding WORM seal. The seal is stored in the append-only ledger and cannot be modified after creation.
Enforcement layer: L828 — Checked on every billable API call before response dispatch
BCR-003
● ACTIVEJurisdiction compliance
Memory writes must be routed to the correct sovereign jurisdiction before cross-region replication is permitted. The jurisdiction graph is sourced from the Atlas knowledge graph and updated within 48 hours of regulatory change events. Cross-region replication without jurisdiction approval is an invariant violation.
Enforcement layer: L828 — Enforced on every memory write operation
BCR-004
● ACTIVEAgent constraint immutability
Agents may not modify their own constitutional constraints, escalate their own permissions, invoke recursive self-modification, or delegate constitutional authority without explicit multi-signature attestation from the required threshold of independent verification nodes.
Enforcement layer: L828 — Checked on every agent self-modification attempt
BCR-005
● ACTIVEAudit trail immutability
No entity — including platform operators, infrastructure providers, or regulatory authorities — may modify, delete, or overwrite a sealed WORM entry. The only permitted operation on the WORM ledger is append. Any read operation may verify chain integrity from the genesis hash.
Enforcement layer: L828 — Structural constraint on WORM ledger — enforced at storage layer
Attestation
Multi-signature modification
Threshold rule
BCR modifications require attestation from k-of-n independent verification nodes where k = ceiling(2n/3). Each attesting node signs the proposed modification using ECDSA over the SHA-256 hash of the proposed rule content. A modification is rejected if the threshold is not met within a 24-hour window.
k = ceiling(2n/3)
sig_i = ECDSA(sk_i, sha256(bcr_proposal))
valid = count(verified_sigs) >= k
window = 24 hours
WORM chain
The BCR set is stored as a WORM chain: each entry sealed using SHA-256 over (rule_content + hash_of_previous_entry), forming an immutable linked list from the genesis hash. Any modification without required attestation produces a chain break detectable by any verifier with access to the genesis hash.
View genesis hash →